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ANTITRUST, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS
AND JOINT VENTURES IN LATIN
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
ROBERT J. RADWAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The approach to technology transfer in Latin America,' al-
though governed by a complicated set of laws, regulations and gov-
ernment policy, arises from the context of economic development
rather than from competition law or antitrust. Antitrust laws exist
in Brazil,2 Argentina3 and Chile,4 and antitrust concepts are scat-
tered throughout some consumer protection regulations and other
policies in Mexico. Enforcement of these antitrust policies extends
more to distribution and pricing issues than to merger policy,
abuses of dominant position or combinations in possible restraint
of trade. This result is predictable in countries at an earlier stage
of industrial development than the United States, members of the
European Economic Community (EEC) or Japan, and in countries
accustomed to economic control by a colonial power or a dictator-
ship. Market forces are not yet strong enough in these countries to
require intervention by anti-monopoly laws, but, at the same time,
other types of intervention are required. Economic development,
including the encouragement of foreign capital and technology, is
generally a higher priority at this stage, although not in every case
and not necessarily forever. In the context of investment and de-
velopment, joint ventures are perceived as a vehicle through which
* Member of the firm of Radway & Dalto in New York City; Former legal advisor to
Council of the Americas, the author has published numerous articles on doing business in
Latin America.
1. For the purposes of this paper, the Latin American countries shall be defined as
Mexico, the Central American countries and those Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking coun-
tries in South America. The discussion will address only Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and to a
lesser extent Chile and the five members of the Andean Common Market or Pact (Colom-
bia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia).
2. Law No. 4.137 of 1962 (Law for Repressions of Abuse of Economic Power).
3. Decree No. 22.262 of Aug. 5, 1980, BOLETIN OFICIAL. (This law became effective on
December 1, 1980).
4. Decree-Law 280 (1973) (in defense of free competition); Decree-Law 280 (1974) (es-
tablished rules to safeguard national economic activity).
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technology and capital can be transferred more effectively, since
the transferor and recipient each have an equity interest and,
therefore, a greater stake in the success of the transfer process.
II. ANTITRUST
A. Colonialism, Independence and Development
When the Latin American countries were colonized by Spain,
and later, Portugal, the principal objective of colonization was the
extraction of gems, mineral wealth, spices and other valuable agri-
cultural commodities from the New World for the mother coun-
tries. The independence of the Latin American countries from
Spain and Portugal in the early nineteenth century did not alter
this practice to any great extent. Wars and revolutions during the
mid-nineteenth century and the industrial revolution in the last
half of the nineteenth century merely institutionalized the process.
During this period, foreign investment in the Latin American
countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, came primar-
ily from the metropolitan or Imperial countries (England, France,
Spain, Portugal, Holland, Italy and later the United States). This
foreign capital was used to build up the infrastructure (railroads
and other forms of transportation, communications, electric power
and utilities) in order to expand the mines and transport the min-
erals to ports for shipment to Europe and, later, to North America.
An outward-oriented development was taking place in the colonies
at that time which subsequently continued to evolve.
B. Dependency Theory
Revolutions which began around the turn of the century cen-
tered around property ownership and the exploitation of the lower
classes by the local land-owning aristocracy, often in conjunction
with the church and/or the sources of foreign investment abroad.
As a result of needs arising during World War I, the Great Depres-
sion and World War II, economists realized that fundamental
changes were required in the development patterns which had
evolved over several centuries. Shortages were suffered during
these periods, and the problem of sharply fluctuating prices for
commodities exported to the metropolitan markets was exacer-
bated by these global crises. Export earnings of hard currency
could not pay for necessary imports which were purchased from
the more industrialized countries.
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The beginnings of the theory of dependencia emerged during
this period. This theory held that the colonial countries (later re-
ferred to as the industrialized countries) formed the centers of the
international economic order or system, with the developing coun-
tries at the periphery. Agricultural and mineral commodities (now
beginning to include hydrocarbons as well as minerals) from the
periphery supplied fuel for the engines of growth in the industrial-
ized countries. The periphery suffered from extreme vulnerability
due to the highly cyclical fluctuation in the prices of the commodi-
ties being exported, and its absolute dependency on the foreign
centers of capital and technology for vital imports. Whatever in-
dustrial technology had been sent to the Latin American countries
by the industrialized countries had accumulated in "enclaves" con-
trolled by local elites who were closely linked to the foreign centers
of capital and decision-making power.
C. Import-Substitution Development Strategy
After World War II and the formation of the United Nations,
its Economic and Social Council, and the regional economic com-
missions (including the Economic Commission for Latin America),
traditional developmental theory became subject to revision and
re-evaluation. While European economists were busy integrating
Europe through the framework laid by the Marshall Plan, Latin
American economists were attempting to execute the vision of Si-
mon Bolivar to integrate the political and economic systems of the
countries in their region. It was determined that a strategy was
required which would emphasize a more inward-oriented develop-
ment. Instead of relying on imports of all capital and consumer
goods, local production would have to be encouraged. Nontradi-
tional exports of light industrial products and additional commodi-
ties from the agricultural sector required development. Economies
of scale were to be encouraged by the regional economic integra-
tion scheme conceived by Dr. Raul Prebisch, 5 the first Director
General of the Economic Commission for Latin America (later the
first Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD)). The conception and design stages
of the regional economic integration took place throughout the
1950's, concurrent with the process in Europe. Consultations be-
5. For a discussion of Dr. Prebisch and the regional integration schemes, see Radway,
The Next Decade in Latin America: Anticipating the Future from the Past, 13 CAsE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 6-15 (1981).
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tween economists in the two regions occurred, but the fundamental
resources with which each of the two groups were working differed
sharply.
D. Development Means Protectionism
The import-substitution strategy of economic development
fostered protectionist policies, creating largely inefficient industries
in each of the Latin American countries. To encourage capital for-
mation, host governments agreed to limit the number of producers
in given industries, in order to permit the local industrial elites
and foreign investors a reasonable return on the capital invested.
Protectionism also included: limitations of imports; price controls;
local content rules; other forms of State intervention; and ex-
tremely paternalistic labor force laws and policies. The strategy
was carried to the extreme in such cases as the Argentine automo-
tive industry where, by the mid-1970's, eleven producers were en-
gaged in the production of automobiles with a total domestic mar-
ket of no more than 220,000 units. Studies on economic
concentration, which were previously scarce or unavailable, began
to emerge in the 1970's. These studies identified the structural im-
pact of the import-substitution development policies. The effects
of these policies continue to hamper balanced economic develop-
ment of all of the Latin American countries, to this date.
E. Protectionism v. Competition
In the course of defining and refining development strategy in
Latin America, it was determined that government must play a
critical role in operating the machinery of the economies. The role
of the government varies in each of the countries in the region, and
each has a different version of "mixed economies" or "State capi-
talism." Monopolies do exist in these countries and are invariably
owned by the State. These so-called "parastatal enterprises" are
common in most basic industries (e.g. petroleum, steel, mining,
railroads, electric power and telephone), and are also often found
in communications, transportation, publishing and other strategi-
cally vital or sensitive sectors. Investment laws in some Latin
American countries expressly reserve investments in these sectors
to the government or to national capital. Administrative practices
in other Latin American countries operate similarly.
Many complaints are heard from individual Latin American
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government and regional economists and technocrats about oligop-
olies, or parallel investment by a limited number of prominent
transnational enterprises (e.g. automotive, pharmaceutical and
chemical). But the anomalies remain: economic development im-
plies (indeed, may even require) protectionism; protectionism im-
plies controlled monopolies and oligopolies, not competition.
Another fundamental consideration is the absence of a policy
resembling articles 30-366 of the Rome Treaty. At present, there is
no policy effectively encouraging the free flow of goods among the
members of Latin American Integration Association (formerly
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)), 7 but only
empty political statements.
III. TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY
Many technocrats from these countries and from regional and
international organizations have expressed the view that Latin
American transfer of technology laws are a form of antitrust regu-
lation. They have listened to United States and European antitrust
experts. They have also read descriptions of the workings of some
of the pro-competition or antimonopoly components of regulatory
mechanisms which are applicable to highly sophisticated and in-
dustrially developed market structures. However, a little bit of
knowledge has often been known to be dangerous. The technology
transfer laws and regulations in the Latin American countries con-
tain some of the concepts, indeed, even some of the phrases, em-
bodied in numerous antitrust cases decided in U.S. courts. The
language, however, is not transferred as easily as the technology.
A. Influence from Antitrust Policy: Exchange Controls
The technology transfer laws were conceived as part of an
overall mechanism to regulate foreign exchange amid a severe bal-
ance of payments crisis. The balance of payment problem was
brought on by recurrent sharp fluctuations in the prices of the
6. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 30-36, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community) (sets forth, inter alia, the strong policy encouraging the free
flow of goods among the member states).
7. See Montevideo Treaty, Feb. 18, 1960, reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: INSTRUMENTS RELATING To THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF
LATIN AMEICA 207 (1968) (hereinafter cited as THE INTERAMERICAN INSTRUMENTS]; The
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) has replaced LAFTA. See Agreement creat-
ing the Latin American Integration Association, signed at Acapulco, Mexico, June 27, 1980.
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commodities which dominate the economies of developing coun-
tries. In Brazil and Colombia, coffee prices were most affected; in
Chile and Peru, copper prices were involved; and in Venezuela, the
price of oil was the concern. In other Latin American countries cof-
fee, cotton, cocoa, bananas, copper, iron ore and oil were of para-
mount importance.
Technology transfer laws first appeared in Brazil. Certain tax
regulations issued in the late 1950's and the Exchange Control Law
of 1962,8 contained provisions specifically designed to address re-
mittance of foreign currency abroad. This included remittance of
technology royalties, technical assistance fees, management fees,
profits or dividends on invested capital and interest on foreign
loans. Lessons were also being drawn from the "Japanese model"
of economic development, which was the centerpiece of many con-
ferences among developing countries. Japan's example of regula-
tion of the inflow of capital and technology and the outflow of pay-
ments was emulated in different degrees by the Latin American
countries.
Certain "abuses" were gleaned from studies performed on
technology transfer arrangements throughout the 1960's and into
the 1970's. These studies were made by organizations in Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina, as well as regional or international organi-
zations (i.e., LAFTA and UNCTAD.) The alleged abuses purport-
edly subjected developing countries to virtually complete depen-
dence on external centers of decision-making and control as a price
for the technology being received.
"Dependency theorists" dominated the discussions and de-
bates in the 1960's. These talks led to the enactment of the Colom-
bian law in 1967, 9 which was the forerunner of the well-known De-
cision 2410 of the Andean Pact." Argentina enacted the first of its
8. Profit Remittance Law, No. 4131 of Sept. 2, 1962, as amended by Law No. 4390 of
Aug. 19, 1964. For a discussion, see Nattier, Brazil, in Technology Transfer: Laws and Prac-
tice In Latin America 145 A.B.A. SEc. INT'L L. Monograph No. 2, 1978 [hereinafter cited as
A.B.A. Monograph]. For a chronology of all the laws passed in Latin America on the subject,
see Radway, Comparative Evolution of Technology Transfer Policies in Latin America:
The Practical Realities, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. P. 204-6 (1980).
9. Decree 444 of Mar. 22, 1967, 30 LEGISLACION ECONOMICA 191 (1967).
10. Andean Common Market Foreign Investment Code, Decision 24: Common Regime
for Treatment of Foreign Capital and Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, Dec. 31,
1970, effective July 31, 1971. See 11 I.L.M. 126 (1972).
11. The Andean Pact, sometimes known as the Andean Common Market or ANCOM,
was an attempt by the middle income countries of the Latin American Free Trade Associa-
tion (LAFTA) to improve their bargaining power vis-a-vis the "big three" (Argentina, Brazil
[Vol. 15:1
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four transfer of technology laws in 1971,2 patterned after Decision
24. Mexico followed with a decree drafted in 1972, which became
effective in 1973.1s The intent of the laws was clear: regulation and
control through State intervention to steer the course of economic
development.
In practice, however, economic development was still the ulti-
mate objective in many cases. Foreign suppliers of technology
strongly resisted the rigid requirements of the newly enacted tech-
nology transfer laws. With inexperienced and inadequately trained
technocrats in the newly created government agencies charged to
review and approve the licensing and related agreements, the bar-
gaining power was clearly unequal. Most of the suppliers of tech-
nology, or their representatives before the agencies, knew far more
than the government technocrats about the relevant development
needs of the host country in their industry, and the ability of the
foreign supplier to fill those needs. Thus, exceptions were made in
those countries where the critical nature of the technology out-
weighed the concern over the loss of foreign reserves in payment of
royalties, fees and other remittances.
Brazil and Colombia, while known to be the most astute and
sophisticated of the Latin American countries in policy formula-
tion, have consistently followed the most rigid implementation pol-
icies. Both countries also have consistent histories of exchange con-
trols. From 1971 to 1976, Argentina pursued a policy which was so
ill-conceived and ill-designed that it resulted in a virtual drying-up
of the flow of technology to that country. When Venezuela joined
the Andean Pact in 1974, and enacted laws implementing Decision
24 internally, 4 the new government agency charged with the re-
and Mexico) who had gained a disproportionate share of the initial benefits of LAFTA. See
Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration (Agreement of Cartagena) signed May 26,
1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969) (effective Oct. 16,
1969).
12. Law No. 19,231 of Sept. 10, 1971, ANALES DE LEGISLACION ARGENTINA.
13. Law on the Registration of Contracts and Agreements Regarding the Transfer of
Technology, Dec. 28, 1972, (effective Jan. 30, 1973). DIARo OFICIAL, (Dec. 30, 1972) See 12
I.L.M. 421 (1973). See also, Radway, Doing Business in Mexico: A Practical Legal Analysis,
14 Irr'L LAw. 361 (1980), and Hyde & Ramirez de [a Corte, Mexico, A.B.A. MONOGRAPH,
supra note 8.
14. Decree 62, GACE'A OFICIAL 1650 (Apr. 28, 1974); See 13 I.L.M. 1220 (1974). Decree
63, GACETA OFICIAL 1650 (Apr. 29, 1974); See 13 I.L.M. 1220 (1974). See generally, Radway,
Venezuela: Certain Legal Considerations for Doing Business, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
289 (1976). See also, Radway & Hoet-Linares, Venezuela Revisited: Foreign Investment,
Technology, and Related Issues, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1-45 (1982).
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sponsibility of implementation, Superindentencia de Inversiones
Extranjeras (SIEX) took a position based more clearly on political
necessity than on a sophisticated bargaining strategy. The Mexi-
cans, as has been traditional in that country, followed a more mod-
erate, middle-of-the-road course. In 1977, Argentina, in its third
law on the subject (a 1974 law" superceded the 1971 law and in-
cluded even more restrictive provisions), became the second coun-
try (Chile was the first) to swing toward a more free-market tech-
nology policy. Chile's policy was liberalized in 197410 after a change
of government, and was further liberalized in 1977'1 after Chile
withdrew from the Andean Pact. Argentina then continued the
process, and in 1981"s passed its fourth law in ten years.
In the meantime, Brazil had issued a set of regulations in
19759 (the Brazilian equivalent of the laws enacted in other coun-
tries) which clarified, redefined and elaborated an overall inte-
grated technology transfer policy. This 1975 policy, referred to as
Normative Act No. 15, is technically not a law but an administra-
tive regulation of an agency of the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce. The fact that it is not a law has not hindered its rigid appli-
cation or that of several subsequent Acts promulgated from 1976
through 1982.20 Brazil's policy position and the practical imple-
mentation of its regulations, however, arose from a balance of pay-
ments problem related to the oil price increases of the 1970's. The
massive transfer of resources instigated by the oil-producing and
exporting countries resulted in a severe blow to the "great Brazil-
ian miracle," a period of nearly ten years when economic growth
rates averaged nearly 10% per year. Thus, technology and pay-
ments for technology became highly visible political scapegoats in
the Brazilian government's valiant struggle to recover from its dev-
astating balance of payments reversal.
15. Law No. 20,794, sanctioned Sept 27, 1974. See also Radway & Giacchino, Argen-
tina, A.B.A. MONOGRAPH, see supra note 8.
16. Decree No. 600 of July 13, 1974, Disio OFICIAL. See 13 I.L.M. 1176 (1974).
17. Published as Decree 1748, (Mar. 18, 1977). See 17 I.L.M. 134 (1978).
18. Law 22.426 of Mar. 12, 1981.
19. Normative Act No. 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, 256 RmVSTA Dz PROPRIEDADE INDUSTRIAL
(Sept. 16, 1975); see also Nattier, A.B.A. MONOGRAPH, supra note 8; and Daniel, The Legal
Ina and Outs of Technology Transfer, BRAzUiN Bus. 17 (Nov. 1977).
20. Normative Act No. 30 DiARiO OFMJcw 380 (Jan. 30, 1978); Normative Act No. 32 of
May 5, 1978, DiAuuo OFciAL 394 (May 9, 1978); Normative Act No. 53, DIARIa OFICIAL (Feb.
16, 1981); Normative Act No. 55 of Sept. 1981; Normative Act No. 60 of Mar. 24, 1982, 599
REVISTA DR PROPRIEDADE INDUSTRIAL (Apr. 13, 1982); Normative Act No. 61 of Mar. 24,
1982, 599 REViSTA DR PROPRIEDADE INDUSTRIAL (Apr. 13, 1982).
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In Mexico, the necessity of creating approximately 750,000
new jobs per year (due to an earlier population growth rate of ap-
proximately 3.5% per annum) resulted in a policy favoring tech-
nology which would lead to the creation of jobs, particularly in la-
bor-surplus regions of the country. This policy, which had
previously motivated the formation of an extraordinarily successful
in-bond assembly industry' was consistent with what was later
embodied in the country's National Industrial Development Plan
(NIDP),2" issued in 1979.
B. Objective of Technology Transfer Laws
Among the stated objectives of the laws enacted in these coun-
tries during the period described above, was the registration of all
agreements embodying a flow of technology in order to begin to
prepare profiles on that process. A similar process had been under-
taken during that period with respect to the flow of capital by the
enactment of foreign investment laws in the same countries. As
mentioned above, " one of the principal objectives was the reduc-
tion of payments for royalties and technical assistance fees abroad,
along with the reduction of remittance of interest and dividend
payments on equity and debt capital.
Greater local control of industrialization remained another
principal objective, one which was enormously broad and elusive.
According to theorists, the alleged abuses identified in the studies
mentioned earlier" led to an attempt to shift some control to local
industrialists in order to facilitate the economic development pro-
cess. The laws all contained prohibitions against the so-called re-
strictive provisions, now frequently referred to as Restrictive Busi-
21. Program Nacional Fronteriza, commonly known as the Maquiladora program; see
address by Minister Campos Salas, Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Aug. 1965). See
also, Radway, note 13 supra, at 369-71; and Inman & Ortiz Tirado, A Mexican Dividend:
Las Maquiladoras, 9 INT'L LAW. 431 (1976).
22. The Mexican Plan was established by a series of four Federal Executive Decrees:
Feb. 2, 1979 (Decree which establishes geographical zones for the execution of the Program
of Incentives for the Territorial Deconcentration of Industrial Activities as anticipated in
the national Plan of Urban Development); Mar. 6, 1979 (Decree that establishes Fiscal In-
centives for the Development of Employment and Investment in Industrial Activities); Mar.
9, 1979 (Agreement that establishes the Fiscal Incentives for the Development of Employ-
ment and Investment in Industrial Activities); Mar. 19, 1979 (Decree that orders the execu-
tion of the National Plan of Industrial Development and establishes the bases for its fulfill-
ment). See Radway, supra note 13, at 371-72.
23. See supra p. 52.
24. See supra p. 52.
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ness Practices (RBP's), which were believed to hinder autonomy
and development.
In Mexico, for example, the registration criteria contained in
article 7 of the 1973 law" (now superceded by a 1982 version)26
contained fourteen RBP's. Six of the RBP's required a mandatory
denial or per se rejection of technology transfer agreements if: the
technology was freely available in Mexico; the agreement contained
provisions limiting exports or the recipient's R & D efforts; it pro-
vided for an excessive term (the Mexican law limited the agree-
ments to a maximum of ten years); it contained grant-back clauses;
or it stipulated that the applicable law or courts to which disputes
were to be submitted for settlement were non-Mexican. The other
eight RBP's described were open to exception. In other words, a
rebuttable presumption was created and a "rule of reason" ap-
proach was applied to evaluation of the agreement. This approach
was applied where: the royalty or fee was "excessive" (guidelines
established in each country usually allowed a maximum of 3% and
less in certain industries); "tie-in" clauses were involved; the out-
put was exclusively sold to the supplier; the supplier was permitted
to intervene in the management of the recipient of the technology;
the use of complementary technology was prohibited; production
volume or selling price limitations were imposed; sales representa-
tion was required by the supplier; or the recipient was required to
employ or use personnel designated by the supplier.
The most controversial of these clauses in Mexico, Brazil and
the Andean Pact countries were those which involved export re-
strictions, royalties, the treatment of confidential information (se-
crecy clauses), tie-ins and grant-backs. Several of these laws have
now been modified. The present policy trend in Latin America ap-
pears to be that many of these items are still negotiable and may
be accepted where the technology supplier can establish the use of
arm's length dealing, reciprocity and generally accepted interna-
tional market prices (for parts, raw materials, etc.) Limited export
restrictions are permitted when exportation to the supplier's home
country market is involved. Frequently, limited restrictions also
apply to countries where the supplier can show registered patents
or a pre-existing network of license agreements. Grant-backs are
25. Supra note 13.
26. Law on the Control and Registration of Transfers of Technology and the Use and
Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks (effective Feb. 10, 1982), DiAzio OFIc AL (Jan. 11,
1982).
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accepted but the royalty-bearing conditions, terms and other as-
pects must be reciprocal.
Royalty rates are still aggressively negotiated in most of the
countries. Argentina and Chile are most flexible, in line with their
recent economic strategies. Venezuela has loosened up somewhat
since 1980. In 1978, officials of the Mexican government technol-
ogy agency stated that, the government had saved $500,000,000 in
royalties due to the skillful application of the technology transfer
laws and policies during the five years of operation of the National
Registry of Technology Transfer (NRTT). In Brazil, where balance
of payments remains the number one priority, royalty rates and
technical assistance fees are extremely low. The question has been
repeatedly raised as to whether this has resulted in Brazil acquir-
ing second-rate technolgy in some cases. Those who answer this
question in the affirmative point to the inefficiencies in many of
the recipient companies as evidence of the fact that lower level
technology is all that suppliers will transfer under the restrictive
terms still prevailing in most of these countries.
The problems of protecting confidential information and re-
stricting the use of such information after the agreement expires
linger to this day. Many suppliers of technology have agreed to
shorten non-disclosure periods. Most suppliers, however, have vig-
orously resisted the desire of some of the registries to permit recip-
ients of the technology to "mix and match" technologies with those
from other suppliers from the same or other countries. The posi-
tion of the Latin American and other developing countries has
been that they have the right to "own" the technology after pay-
ment for the limited term permitted by the laws of their country.
Suppliers are more concerned that competitors will get cheap ac-
cess to expensive developments.
The final objective of the laws in these countries has been to
produce an inventory of, or to identify, the categories of technology
being received and the transfer patterns. The desire to design and
implement regional technology policies in order to encourage the
indigenous development of important technology in the Latin
American countries has emerged in declarations and decrees over
the last number of years. To date, these regional cooperative tech-
nology policy efforts have met with minimal success.
27. See Radway and Hoet-Linares, supra note 14, at pp. 24-27.
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C. Negotiating Technology Agreements with the Competent
Authority
The host government criteria for negotiation of these technol-
ogy transfer agreements by its technocrats28 incorporate several
important economic development goals. One goal is to attract tech-
nology which will fill the needs of those industries which the gov-
ernment has designated as priority sectors for development. An-
other is the promotion of exports, which has formed the core of the
modern strategy of economic development and has, to a great ex-
tent, replaced the import-substitution strategy. However, economic
development has many facets, and some countries in Latin
America have begun to follow the Japanese model and have ex-
amined comparative advantage as the basis for building strong, ex-
port competitive industries. The general rubric of economic devel-
opment also specifies increased local content (national integration)
in such industries as the automotive industry. A multiplier effect is
thus created, having the objective of establishing a supplier infra-
structure for those industries.
Employment, or the creation of jobs for that segment of the
population entering the eligible work force, is a very important cri-
terion, particularly in Mexico and Brazil. Extremely high popula-
tion growth rates prevailed in Mexico, Brazil and other Latin coun-
tries until very recent years, when they began to drop impressively.
Argentina has less of a growth rate problem, since its population
has remained relatively constant in recent years. Therefore, in
many cases, technology which will create more jobs (i.e., labor in-
tensive) may be given a higher priority in the evaluation criteria.
Finally, improvement of the balance of payments is a crucial
criterion in all of the countries. At minimum, achieving this goal
entails promotion of exports, substitution or reduction of imports,
and minimization of foreign currency payments abroad, particu-
larly in those countries with exchange controls. On September 1,
1982, Mexico joined Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile and others in
the category of countries with exchange controls.2 9 Argentina has
drifted in and out of this category, most recently rejoining the
group after its conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falkland
28. See, generally Radway, Negotiating with Latin American Governments: Technol-
ogy Transfer & Service Agreements, 9 LAw. AM. 282 (1977).
29. Decree that Establishes the Generalized Exchange Controls, DieA OFIC L (Sept.
1, 1982).
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Islands further damaged its economy and further deteriorated its
exchange reserve position. In February 1983, Venezuela joined the
ranks of this group as well.
As a practical matter, the technocrats, who have become in-
creasingly sophisticated over the last decade, nQw screen and
evalute technology transfer agreements in conjunction with pro-
posals for new investment approvals or approvals of plant expan-
sions. Coordination and cross-indexing have also become more so-
phisticated in these countries. Qualitative as well as quantitative
studies are now being performed which show that the domestic
market can profitably support only two or three plants of a partic-
ular nature. The technocrats, particularly in Mexico since a mid-
stream policy change in 1978, have shown greater appreciation of
the investor's need to realize an adequate return in order to con-
tinue the capital formation process.
The supplier of capital and technology negotiates with the au-
thorities for approval of the "manufacturing plan" submitted in
conjunction with the investment application. Frequently, a tech-
nology agreement is submitted simultaneously. For a variety of
reasons, (often new or relatively new technology is involved, the
investment may be in a pioneer industry, new plants require a rea-
sonable start-up period in order to become profitable, etc.) the in-
vestor/technology supplier is in a relatively good position to negoti-
ate with the host government technocrats for some limitations
(protections) which are essential to permit realization of an ade-
quate return on invested capital. Another important protection
granted the investor during the course of the negotiations is an
agreement to restrict imports of competitive products. Sometimes
this restriction lasts for a limited period of time; other times it is
of indefinite duration.
A pragmatic investment approval process has evolved in Mex-
ico, which has nevertheless resulted in protectionism. Unfortu-
nately, the 1982 economic disaster in Mexico may have reversed
the progress made by government technocrats during the preceed-
ing four years in attracting foreign investment to that country. It is
still premature to evaluate what the policy on investments and
transferring technology will be for the new government which took
office on December 1, 1982.
1983]
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
D. Host Government Technology Dilemma
Where employment or job creation is a high priority for the
host government, labor-intensive technology has been expressly
preferred, both publicly and privately, by many of the technocrats.
The local entrepreneurs, however, often appreciate the importance
of capital-intensive technology to improve efficiency and produc-
tivity. These governments, facing increasingly serious balance of
payments problems, due to interest payments and repayment of
principal on expanding foreign debt burdens, have imposed export
objectives or requirements on foreign investors. Sometimes the
new export commitments sought are equal to the required imports
to feed the new plant (offset agreements).
Both the foreign and the local entrepreneur appreciate that an
improved level of quality, efficiency and training is required in or-
der to achieve export competitiveness. These factors are also objec-
tives of the technology transfer laws and policies. The Latin Amer-
ican countries find themselves caught on the horns of the
proverbial dilemma: How to create additional employment to mini-
mize the political risk of a disenchanted labor force (and the popu-
lation as a whole) while at the same time attempting to attract
more efficient technology which will improve the competitive posi-
tion of exports and restore a balance of payments equilibrium.
E. Protection of Industrial Property
The discussion of technology transfer would not be complete
without some mention of the treatment of the industrial property
underlying the transfer process. The Mexican Law on Inventions
and Trademarks of 19760 is useful to illustrate the erosion of in-
dustrial property rights protection. This law designates areas of
the economy for priority in development and innovation. These
sectors also received stronger emphasis and priority in the NIDP
(1979). 3" The food and agricultural sector, for example, is given a
high priority for development under the NIDP. Many innovations
and discoveries falling within this general category are therefore no
longer patentable under the Inventions and Trademarks Law. In-
30. Law on Inventions and Trademarks, DIABJO OFFICIAL (Feb. 10, 1976). See also
Radway, supra note 13, at 368-69; Hyde and Ramirez de la Corte, Mexico's New Transfer of
Technology and Foreign Investment Laws-To What Extent Have the Rules Changed?, 10
INT'L LAw. 231 (1976).
31. See supra note 22.
[Vol. 15:1
LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
cluded in this group are: vegetable varieties; animal breeds; alloys;
industrial processes for obtaining alloys; chemical products (but
not new processes or new uses); chemical/pharmaceutical products;
medicines; food and beverages for human or animal use; fertilizers;
pesticides; herbicides; and fungicides. Also regarded as unpatent-
able are inventions related to nuclear energy, security and anti-pol-
lution apparatus and equipment. (The growing concern over pollu-
tion is also evident from the NIDP policies on deconcentration of
industry.) In essence, no monopolies are granted through the pat-
ent system for any of the areas which national policy dictates
should be "opened up" for indigenous technological development.
Trademarks have also been subject to increasing scrutiny and
criticism on so-called "public interest" grounds. Actual use of reg-
istered marks in accordance with established criteria is now re-
quired. Registration of idle marks lapses after three years. The
owner has a priority right to re-register if the original registration
lapsed for non-use. One stated objective of this practice is to lower
prices to the consumer by reducing advertising expenditures. Some
suggest that the government also has a "public interest" justifica-
tion in prohibiting the use of trademarks on certain products (e.g.,
cosmetic, pharmaceutical and medicinal products) and to require
sale of such products under generic names.
The same 1976 law contains the well-known trademark "link-
ing" rule which requires that products manufactured locally under
a foreign-registered trademark be linked with a new, local mark of
equal prominence. However, enforcement problems were so great
that implementation of this requirement has been postponed an-
nually. Another example of the reduced protection given to indus-
trial property is compulsory licensing.
Finally, "unpatented knowhow" is given virtually no protec-
tion in any of the Latin American countries. "Unpatented know-
how" is the subject of some of the most precious and critical li-
censes designed to improve industrial efficiency and productivity.
It is also contained in the supply of basic and detailed engineering
used in major infrastructure and processing plant projects. Brazil's
Normative Act No. 17 of 19762 has gone so far as to expressly
declare that "unpatented knowhow" is part of the public domain.
None of the laws on technology transfer afford any protection to
32. Normative Act No. 17 of May 11, 1976, 292 REVISTA DA PROPRIEDADE INDUSTRIAL
(May 25, 1976).
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this type of industrial property. Even linking together provisions in
the civil, commercial, labor and penal codes of any given Latin
American country does not provide adequate protection for the un-
authorized use of this type of industrial property. The concept of
"unfair competition" is loosely defined in these countries. The con-
cept closest to our "trade secret laws" provides only minimal pro-
tection against an employee disclosing information gained during
the course of his employment to a third party. However, injunctive
relief is not available in any of these countries to prevent the use
of this information by a third party.
F. New Developments in Computer Software Technology
Transfer
The tremendous surge of computer software transfer is the
most significant phenomenon in the entire field of technology
transfer. This subject is now being recognized as having a signifi-
cant impact on the development of technology, locally and on in-
dustrial development generally. Brazil addressed one aspect of the
"high technology" problem during the mid-1970's when the gov-
ernment issued a regulation requiring local ownership and control
of all new joint ventures in the telecommunications industry.s
Shortly thereafter, Brazil established a program for the develop-
ment of the mini-computer industry. This program also required
Brazilian ownershp and control of new joint ventures. Formation
of a limited number (specifically, four) of new joint ventures, as
well as an entirely Brazilian company, was approved to produce
indigenous mini-computers in that country. Software and periph-
eral equipment were to be addressed in subsequent stages, how-
ever, the software policy has not yet been clarified. The Brazilian
mini-computer program got off to a stormy beginning. Critics now
take the position that since the mini-computer technology trans-
ferred to Brazil belongs to an earlier generation, their products will
not be export competitive. In addition, the Brazilian industrial de-
velopment program suffers from a lack of the most up-to-date
technology for internal use.
In late 1981, Mexico announced its own development program
for the mini-computer industry. Two United States companies re-
ceived approval for new investments to build mini-computers in
33. Ministry of Communications Portaria 622 of June 19, 1978, Dixrwo OFICIAl, June 23,
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Mexico. These companies were permitted to retain 100% control,
which is a clear exception to the Mexican Foreign Investment Law.
A third company's previously approved 100% investment is cur-
rently being revised to comply with the new program. At least two
additional applications are known to have been received. The Mex-
ican government is again exhibiting sufficient flexibility in an at-
tempt to attract the technology required for its industrial develop-
ment. The 1982 Technology Transfer Law, however, contains some
important new provisions " which will affect the transfer of tech-
nology involving computer software. Under the new law, any agree-
ment "related to computer software" must now be registered with
the government technology registry.36 Officials have indicated, both
publicly and privately, that they will not subject such agreements
to the same criteria used in the past for traditional licenses. The
economic crisis of 1982 has probably further complicated the clari-
fication and implementation of this policy. The software revolution
is likely to encounter regulatory barriers from the technology
transfer laws, from the policies being formulated within UNESCO
and other U.N. agencies under the "New World Information Or-
der", and from the attempts to regulate transborder data flow.
IV. JOINT VENTURES
The importance of technology and capital flow to the develop-
ment process was identified in the early 1960's. This new aware-
ness followed previous concentration by the U.N. and international
conferences on trade and the commodity price fluctuation problem.
As attention shifted from trade to investment (including the
technology flow), the focus became: How the Latin American coun-
tries could best shift some degree of control to nationals, encourage
the local development of technology, and bring more decisions into
the host country and away from the foreign centers of decision-
making. Foreign investment laws were enacted as part of larger
"regulation and control systems" in an attempt to accomplish
these objectives. The Mexican Foreign Investment Law 6 and Deci-
sion 24 7 of the Andean Pact are the two most well-known pieces of
34. Supra, note 26.
35. Id. art. 2(m).
36. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, DLA'uo
OpicIAL (Mar. 9, 1973).
37. See supra note 10.
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legislation in this area and will be discussed below.38
A. Increasing Capital Formation
Since the independence of the Latin American countries from
Spain and Portugal, each of the major countries has experienced
periods of dictatorship. The most famous dictatorship- in recent
times was in Argentina where General Juan Peron, reigned in the
early 1940's and the 1950's and again in the 1970's. In Brazil, Getu-
lio Vargas, reigned until the mid-1950's and, in Mexico, the reign
of Porfirio Diaz, spanned roughly from 1870 until the outbreak of
revolution in 1910. These benevolent dictatorships were successful
in attracting new foreign investment. Modern developmental
objectives of attracting capital and technology while at the same
time increasing national control over the industrial development
process are often inconsistent and sometimes irreconcilable. Never-
theless, the decision was made that the State must assume a more
active role in ownership as well as in the regulation and control of
the economies. The State may, in modern times, fill the role for-
merly held by the dictator.
The objective in recent years has been to encourage local sav-
ings and investment (the capital formation process) to blend with
the foreign capital and technology being sought. The joint venture
became an increasingly popular suggestion during the 1960's and
1970's, as resourceful and creative Latin American economists ex-
amined various alternatives and drafted new legislation. It was ar-
gued that the joint venture would limit the control by foreigners to
49% or less. This would give the foreign supplier of capital and
technology a high enough stake in the enterprise to ensure its suc-
cess, while requiring control and majority ownership to be in the
hands of local shareholders. The complexities of the joint venture
form of operation were yet to be realized.
B. Increasing Local Control over Investment and Development
Increased local control proved to be an elusive concept, how-
ever, as transnational enterprises and other suppliers of technology
were reluctant to transfer the secrets of their industrial success
into the hands of local majority shareholders whose decisions they
cannot control, either legally or operationally. In view of the confi-
38. See infra pp. 65-68.
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dentiality and other provisions of the technology transfer laws de-
scribed above, 9 it was apparent that the objective of these laws
was to transfer and assign actual control over the technology to
locals. As had been predicted, United States and European inves-
tors, assisted by their own counsel as well as creative local counsel
in the Latin American countries, discovered ingenious ways of
complying with the letter of the law but not necessarily the spirit.
This was not a new approach, since bearer shares and straw men
had been used for many years in various international operations.
In addition, the use of offshore holding companies was invoked in
order to structure control in such a way that it essentially re-
mained in the hands of the foreign suppliers of capital and
technology.
C. Parastatal, National and Foreign Companies
The new policy frameworks -clearly addressed the objective of
increasing the control by the State. This was to be accomplished
through: direct ownership of basic and other industries; the paras-
tatal or quasi-governmental corporations in the oil and gas sector
(e.g., Petrobras in Brazil, Pemex in Mexico and YPFB in Argen-
tina) the iron and steel sector, railroads, communications, electric
power and other basic industries; and by completely (100%) na-
tionally owned private companies, or those companies where na-
tionals had a majority equity and control position.
D. Approaches to Joint Ventures in Different Countries
Brazil's approach to joint ventures did not require the explicit
use of a decree or law stating the limitations on percentages of
ownership in various industries as did the Mexican law and, to a
great extent, Decision 24 of the Andean Pact countries.40 Instead,
Brazil established a series of financial institutions during the early
1970's 4' to provide attractive financing as an incentive for invest-
ment in various sectors of the economy. The charter of each of the
financial entities, as well as the criteria for qualifying for financial
39. See supra pp. 55-57.
40. See supra note 11.
41. The Brazilian National Economic Development Bank (BNDE) established four sub-
sidiaries to finance projects in specific sectors: FINAME, the Special Agency for Industrial
Financing (machinery); EMBRAMEC, the Mechanics Corporation (capital goods); FIBASE,
the Basic Inputs Corporation (raw materials); and IBRASA, the Investments Corporation
(capital).
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assistance on significantly advantageous terms, favored those com-
panies with a 51 % or greater Brazilian equity and control. In addi-
tion to the financial structure, the Technology Transfer Law, cou-
pled with the Industrial Property Code,'2 prohibited the payment
of royalties or certain related fees from a Brazilian subsidiary to its
controlling foreign parent. Thus, to receive a stream of royalty and
technical assistance payments for most transactions, the foreign
parent would have to divest itself down to 49% or less ownership
of its Brazilian subsidiary. The operating effect was the same as
formally limiting the percentage of ownership. In addition, Brazil
passed more explicit decrees and regulations in three particular in-
dustries: banking, telecommunications and the mini-computer in-
dustry discussed above.'"
Mexico's approach, on the other hand, was to enact the For-
eign Investment Law,"4 effective in 1973. This law specified various
categories of investments, some of which were reserved to the State
and others which were reserved to parastatal enterprises. A third
category of investments was reserved to enterprises composed ex-
clusively of Mexican nationals or companies with a "foreign exclu-
sion" clause in their by-laws. A fourth category was reserved for
those investments in which foreign participation was limited to a
maximum of 49%. In certain industries (automotive, petrochemi-
cal, and mining) foreign participation was limited to 40% or less
by specific provisions and other sector-specific regulations. At the
same time, however, the Mexican government, which did not limit
dividend remittances to a percentage of registered capital (as does
the Brazilian, Argentine and Andean Pact legislation) reduced the
allowable royalty in the technology transfer process when the sup-
plier of technology owned 49% of the technology recipient (joint
venture/licensee). Thus, using a different approach than the
Brazilians, the Mexicans also attempted to limit the overall foreign
exchange (return on investment) for the foreign investor/technol-
ogy supplier.
In the countries of the Andean Pact,'2 Decision 24 defined
three different types of enterprises which were permitted to exist
within the regional integration scheme: national companies which
42. Law No. 5772 of Dec. 21, 1971, DOU-I of Dec. 31, 1971, 35 LEX 1740 (Sao Paulo,
1971).
43. See supra pp. 62-63.
44. See supra note 26.
45. See supra note 11.
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were 80% or more owned by national investors; mixed companies
which were betwen 50% and 79% owned by nationals; and foreign
companies which were 49% or less owned by nationals.4" New en-
terprises were required to comply with the new rules. Pre-existing
enterprises were required to conform, which involved divestment
(fade-out) over varying periods of from 15 to 22 years. Limitations
were placed on the sectors which were accessible to foreign compa-
nies and to mixed companies for investment purposes. One of the
areas that caused the greatest amount of controversy, particularly
in Venezuela and Colombia, was the reservation to national com-
panies of the area of "internal commercialization" of goods, or dis-
tribution/marketing companies. Complicated rules evolved, partic-
ularly in Venezuela, which provided for different combinations of
manufacturing and distribution companies. These rules set forth
the relevant criteria for approval, including export quotas and a
requirement that certain percentages of national content be incor-
porated into the products. If a company met both standards, it
would receive approval by the necessary government agency to go
forward with its investment.47 Companies which exported 80% or
more of their product were exempt from these complicated regula-
tions. In addition, companies which did not seek to take advantage
of the other features of the regional integration program did not
have to comply with the ownership requirements, but were still ex-
cluded from the prohibited sectors.
During the second Peron administration, Argentina enacted a
severe Foreign Investment Law" which contained provisions simi-
lar to some of those included in the policies of Brazil, Mexico and
the Andean group. Argentina's rigid over-enforcement of its For-
eign Investment and Technology Laws resulted in an effective cur-
tailment of new investment and technology, which was reversed by
a change of government in 1976.
Chile, one of the original members of the Andean Pact, ad-
hered to the Andean Pact rules to some degree. However, Chile
also imposed its own socialist pattern of nationalization of indus-
tries across the board. The military government which acceded to
power in 1973, after the overthrow of Allende, embarked on a dif-
ferent course (as did the military government in Argentina emerg-
46. See supra note 10, at art. 1.
47. Venezuelan Decree 62, supra note 14, at art. 1(c).
48. Foreign Investment Law 20,557 1977 C. ANALES 3670. See 12 I.L.M. 1489 (1973).
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ing in 1976). The Chilean government issued a decree in 1974"'
governing foreign investment. Although generally following the
patterns of Andean Pact Decision 24, the Chilean decree tended to
be somewhat more liberal. That law was never enforced with the
same degree of rigidity as those in Colombia, Venezuela and Peru.
In 1976, Chile, partly due to a major alteration of economic policy,
withdrew from the Andean Pact.5" A much more liberal foreign in-
vestment law was enacted in that country in 1977,11 opening the
door wide to the "free market" investment and technology transfer
policies referred to as "Chicago school" economics.
E. Practical Problems with Joint Ventures in Latin America
The approaches taken by each of the countries referred to
above were quite different. Even the countries within the modified
Andean Pact embarked on different courses and in different direc-
tions. Only Brazil enforced its rules rigidly. Columbia made the
fewest exceptions in its joint venture/foreign investment and tech-
nology transfer policies. Exceptions were more the rule in Vene-
zuela. Mexico followed a pragmatic path, particularly after the
early years of experience with its new set of laws. The patterns
that emerged through the last years of the 1970's and into the
1980's have shown, for the most part, a much greater degree of
tolerance and flexibility with respect to the requirements, needs
and objectives of the foreign investor.
Recognition has emerged throughout Latin America of the dif-
ficult and complicated nature of the joint venture form of doing
business. Although it may be a vehicle to attract technology and
facilitate the development process, in many cases the joint venture
is seen as a transitory form. The average life of a joint venture in
Brazil has been estimated to be between six and seven years. In
Mexico, it is too early to tell what the lifespan will be, although
joint ventures formed in the mid to late 1970's are already encoun-
tering serious problems. Many companies have changed partners in
Mexico since the early 1970's, when the initial "Mexicanization"
wave occurred and joint ventures were formed. A similar pattern is
beginning to emerge in Venezuela, and to a lesser extent in Colom-
49. Decree-Law 600 DIARIO OFICIAL (July 13, 1974). See 13 I.L.M. 1176 (1974).
50. Additional Protocol Oct. 5, 1976. See also, Chile Walks Out as Andean Talks Col-
lapse, LATIN AM. ECON. REP. 145 (1977).
51. Revised Decree-Law 600, published as Decree 1748, Mar. 18, 1977. See 17 I.L.M.
134 (1978).
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bia and Peru. Argentina and Chile have attempted, in very differ-
ent ways, to follow along a "free market" oriented path.
By dramatically lowering tariffs on most items, they permitted
more imports during the late 1970's in order to increase competi-
tion and force many industries to modernize and improve their ef-
ficiency. The same policy was followed to a much lesser extent in
Peru, Mexico and even in Venezuela. The results are not yet in,
but it is clear that after four to six decades of protection in these
countries, the entrepreneurs were not ready for free market eco-
nomics. Competition has in fact destroyed elements of the private
sector, particularly in Argentina and Chile.
The banking systems of many of these countries bear a great
deal of the responsibility for some of this destruction. The absence
of legislation of the Glass-Steagall type permits banks to be part of
industrial groups in many of these countries. This and other tradi-
tions have encouraged indiscriminate lending policies by local as
well as foreign banks. The energy crisis of the 1970's and 1980's,
coupled with the world-wide recession which has emerged in the
1980's, has resulted in insolvencies and liquidity problems in many
of these countries. The recent nationalization of the banks in Mex-
ico52 is a reaction to the extreme financial crisis in which that
country finds itself. Argentina suffered a rash of bankruptcies over
the last two years, both in the financial and industrial sectors. Only
Brazil has managed to avoid similar chaos. The foreign debts of
Brazil and Mexico are the highest in the Third World, and that of
Argentina is a distant third. Debt rescheduling has become the or-
der of the day.
V. CONCLUSION
The economic systems in several of these countries are under-
going fundamental structural change. It is clear that the years
ahead will pose formidable challenges for the government planners
as well as for the captains of industry. Competition will begin to
pervade the thinking, and the joint venture will continue to be
used where selectively appropriate. Antimonopoly laws may well
emerge in those countries where they are not yet present, and se-
lective enforcement of these laws will increase in those countries
where the laws already exist. Latin America must emerge from the
52. Decree that Establishes the Nationalization of Private Banks, DIARIO OFICIAL (Sept.
1, 1982).
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decade of the 1980's much better prepared to compete with other
newly industrializing countries, or it will again find itself in a posi-
tion of dependencia - this time to the international financial
community.
